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Ukraine’s upcoming parliamentary elections in March 2002 will determine not only the new 
composition of the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada). They will also define the correlation 
of forces between the parliament, the president, and the government, the model of the 2004 
presidential elections, and the fate of Ukrainian reforms and the geopolitical behavior of the 
country. 
The Election Rules 
On October 18, 2001, the Rada adopted a new election law and the president signed it on 
November 2. President Leonid Kuchma rejected the Rada’s five previous election laws and the 
parliament had been unable to gather a constitutional majority to overcome his veto. A purely 
proportional system was initially proposed. After this was rejected, a system with party lists 
accounting for 75 percent of the seats was proposed and again rejected. In the end, the parliament 
yielded to Kuchma and kept the mixed majoritarian-proportional system introduced in 1998: 225 
deputies elected in single-member districts and 225 elected by party lists with a 4 percent 
electoral hurdle. Additionally, the new electoral law mandated that a party needs to register at 
least a year before the elections to field candidates and parties that won in previous elections or 
have factions in parliament are able to participate in district electoral commissions. Another of 
Kuchma’s victories over the Rada in the election law was the shortening of the campaign from 
180 days to 90 days. The electoral campaign will formally start on January 1, 2002, and last until 
the voting day, March 31, 2002. In reality, however, the campaign unofficially began in 
September 2001 as parties began to forge alliances and wage their struggle in the media.  
Players and Chances 
The main actors with a chance to pass the 4 percent threshold include:  
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The Left: 
• The Communists, according to survey data, can expect their traditional 15–20 percent, 
which derives mostly from the older generation. The Communists have consistently been a 
convenient opposition group as Kuchma and his entourage have been able to redirect public 
anger and resentment toward the Communists by scapegoating them and thus channel hostile 
public opinion away from Kuchma. 
• The left-center Socialist Party, led by former Rada speaker Oleksander Moroz, can expect to 
narrowly meet the 4 percent threshold with about 5 percent of the vote. Moroz has to turn to 
the traditional left to get votes, but the gulf between Moroz and orthodox Communists 
continues to widen. 
Ideologically Amorphous Propresidential Center:  
• The bloc For United Ukraine, which now consists of five parties: the People’s Democratic 
Party (administrative nomenklatura), Labor Ukraine (a loose formation of financial and 
industrial tycoons), Party of Regions (mainly a political representation of Donetsk-based 
mining and metallurgy syndicates), Agrarian Party (the agrarian administrative corps and 
heads of big agrarian enterprises), and Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (directors of 
large industrial plants and medium-size businesses associated with them). Together with 
SDPU (u), these parties form the “oligarch layer.” They declared unconditional support for 
Kuchma and their share of the vote has been predicted to fall between 4 and 9 percent. 
• Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United)—SDPU (u). The party is “social-democratic” 
only in name. Business tycoons Hryhoriy Surkis and vice-speaker Viktor Medvedchuk 
control it. Its current support level is around 4 percent. On December 13 Medvedchuk was 
dismissed as the Rada’s first vice-speaker by the combined vote of the Left and Center-Right. 
• The Green party could gain up to 5 percent, mostly because of its attractive title. Several 
banking groups also support it. 
Center-Right 
• Yuri Yushchenko’s block Our Ukraine includes parties of national-democratic orientation 
that supported ex-premier Yushchenko during his tenure, including both branches of Rukh 
(Movement) and Reforms and Order. These three parties promised to unite after the 
elections. Mavericks from other blocs as well as most of the Federation of Trade Unions of 
Ukraine have joined them. Due to Yushchenko’s high personal rating, this bloc is expected to 
gain 15–17 percent of the vote; it optimistically hopes for up to 25 percent. 
• Yulia Tymoshenko’s block may gain up to 5 percent of the vote. It includes her party 
“Bat’kivshchyna” (Fatherland) along with the right-wing remnants of the anti-Kuchma 
Forum of National Salvation. Moderate members of the FNS joined the Yushchenko bloc. 
Apart from these leading contenders, several other parties will be trying to overcome the 4 
percent threshold:  
• An ultraleft populist Progressive Socialist party, led by Natalia Vitrenko, helped 
propresidential forces split the left camp in previous elections and take votes from Moroz 
(whom Kuchma considered his most dangerous rival).  
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Structures from the ideologically amorphous and propresidential center include: 
• The Democratic Union party, which solicited ex-security council secretary Volodymyr 
Horbulin to be head of its list.  
• The eccentric libertarian party Yabluko (Apple), which tries to exploit the topics of 
excessive taxation and scandalous, arrogant campaigning.  
• Kyiv city mayor Oleksander Omelchenko heads the block Unity. Omelchenko plans to use 
his reputation as an effective mayor and the administrative means of the Association of Cities 
that he heads. According to polls, Unity so far fails to surpass the threshold.  
• The so-called People’s Rukh for Unity proclaimed itself, with the encouragement of 
Yushchenko’s rivals, to be a successor of the united People’s Rukh of the early 1990s 
(despite the protests of two main branches of Rukh that joined Yushchenko’s block).  
• Women for Future, allegedly supported by Kuchma’s wife, actively promotes itself using 
charity and local-level projects as a means to demonstrate its ability to “help people”. 
• A group of well-to-do businessmen and politicians, with support from the presidential 
entourage, plans to create a “new liberal movement” and to gain the votes of those 
dissatisfied by existing parties but more or less content with a market economy and 
Ukrainian statehood.  
Up to 25 percent of the population remain undecided as to their preferences, and about 30 
percent do not trust any existing political party. There is, then, considerable political space in 
which these parties can maneuver. 
Electoral Risks 
There is a real risk that several factors will taint the upcoming elections, including, most 
prominently: 
I. Underdevelopment of the party system and the concentration of real decisionmaking within 
the closed circle of the president’s entourage.  
Parliamentary elections are traditionally less prone to administrative irregularities than 
presidential elections. Yet, the “parties of power” still rely on the “administrative resource,” and 
the main actors enjoy constant attention from the president’s administration. Volodymyr Lytvyn, 
the head of the administration, is to become the head of the For United Ukraine list and Prime 
Minister Anatoli Kinakh is also to occupy a high position on the bloc’s list. Yushchenko’s bloc 
also received candidates from Kuchma’s administration, including the former deputy head of the 
president’s administration, Yuri Yekhanurov, and the president’s representative in parliament, 
Roman Bessmertny. Although both politicians are on good terms (both professionally and 
personally) with Yushchenko, they are also personally loyal to the president. 
II. Unbalanced influence on Ukrainian society from external sources. 
Oligarchs control most of the major private newspapers in Ukraine, with only a few 
encouraging exceptions. Oligarchs or Russian capital control most TV channels (although 
several influential channels initially started with the participation of Western capital). The 
“tapegate” scandal and the struggle between “parties of power,” however, provided additional 
opportunities for the Ukrainian media to secure relatively balanced coverage of the events. 
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Outside, mainly Russian, PR specialists are actively engaged in this electoral campaign. For 
United Ukraine invited the Russian image company “Nikkolo M” to work for them, the SDPU(u) 
enjoys the services of Russian president Vladimir Putin’s image-maker Gleb Pavlovski, and 
several other PR specialists work with a number of other parties and blocs. 
The formal justification for inviting Russian PR specialists to help with a campaign is their 
practical knowledge (with its 89 federation units, Russia undergoes elections year-round). Yet, to 
a considerable extent, the business ties of Ukrainian tycoons, their acquaintance with “new 
methods” of campaigning, as well as their personal acquaintance with Russian PR specialists, 
dictated this choice and may diminish the access of similar Ukrainian institutions to 
decisionmakers. 
Possible Scenarios 
A victory for the oligarch parties will lead to the continuation of present undefined policies. 
Given a stronger Russian presence in Ukrainian politics and economy and limited chances to 
repay the gas debts Ukraine owes Russia without radical economic reform, Ukraine will likely 
fall into further economic dependence on Russia and could eventually coordinate foreign and 
security issues with it. This scenario requires a long-term strategy from Russia. If Russian 
tycoons infringe on the economic interests of their Ukrainian counterparts, the latter will likely 
switch to a Ukraine-centered policy. So far, Putin’s Russia has demonstrated the ability to deal 
with Ukraine cautiously, so the “economic russification” scenario is indeed plausible. 
However, if Our Ukraine garners up to 20 percent of the vote, it will be able to form a 
coalition with factions of other reform-minded blocs (for instance, the mavericks from For 
United Ukraine, which is too loose to remain solid; majoritarian deputies; and new parties that 
are psychologically closer to the liberal reforms approach). In this case, the oligarchs will have to 
consider Our Ukraine a formidable force and negotiate a coalition government, possibly a 
reform-oriented coalition at that, with support from the parliamentary majority, which has not yet 
happened since Ukrainian independence. A significant stumbling block to this scenario is that it 
requires the national democrats to negotiate and reach compromises among them and with the 
like-minded from other parties.  
Thus, the first scenario remains one of the possible options. This puts forward a long-term 
task for European- and liberal-minded groups, parties, and NGOs in Ukraine, with possible 
support from Western organizations: to develop a system of counterinfluence, promote 
democratic standards, and prepare a new generation of decisionmakers. This should include 
university-, media-, and NGO- oriented programs that would allow the creation of a network of 
opinion-building and educational centers, which would provide both the public and 
decisionmakers with feasible prodemocratic and pro-European alternatives.  
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